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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
To say that America is a nation on wheels would be, 
of course, a trite expression. Americans have been "on the 
move" in an ever-increasing rate since Henry Ford first made 
such mass migration possible. The automobile has become not 
only an instrument for pleasure but, for most, a matter of 
economic necessity. However, the automobile has also intro- 
duced many problems, not the least of which is that of com- 
pensating victims of automobile accidents in those instances 
where claims and judgments arising out of accidents cannot be 
collected because of the financial irresponsibility of the 
negligent driver. 
The principle that an individual is responsible for 
his own wrongs and personal misfortunes has always been a 
part of the American philosophy. These are the burdens of 
the individual, and the economic risks that all must chance 
pertain as well to the operation of an automobile. The 
alleviation of the economic distress of uncompensated victims 
of automobile accidents in those cases where fault has been 
established has been accomplished in part through legislation 
in the form of financial responsibility laws. Such legisla- 
tion places the burden of compensating victims of automobile 
accidents upon the careless and irresponsible driver, and is 
2 
designed to induce motorists to see that they are financially 
able to pay for injuries and property damage they may inflict 
with their vehicles. The laws tend to encourage motorists to 
become insured by imposing financial requirements on them if 
they are involved in accidents and can not show other evidence 
of financial responsibility.1 
State financial responsibility legislation, dating 
back to the 1920s, attests to the long-standing public policy 
that all operators of motor vehicles should be financially 
responsible. Implicit in this policy is the underlying prop- 
osition that the cost of injuries and damage inflicted because 
of negligence should not be permitted to rest upon the shoul- 
ders of the victim and that, where necessary, society should 
see to it that the cost of these injuries is forced upon the 
negligent wrongdoer. 
Connecticut was the first state to enact a "financial 
responsibility law"; it was effective January 1, 1926. 
Vermont and Rhode Island followed with the enactment of similar 
laws in 1927. Other states soon followed suit, and in 1939 
Kansas adopted with but few changes the Uniform Financial 
Responsibility Act (Act IV, Uniform Vehicle Code) "to ameli- 
orate the harsh effects of uncompensated automobile 
1 
Automobile liability insurance may not be the only 
means of showing evidence of financial responsibility, but 
since this is the most reliable method in the majority of 
cases, the laws tend to encourage all motorists to become 
insured. 
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accidents."2 Kansas was the 35th state to adopt such 
financial responsibility legislation. 
During the 1957 session of the Kansas legislature an 
act was passed entitled "Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Respon- 
sibility Act" which repealed the Financial Responsibility Law 
of 1939 and provided much broader provisions for compensating 
victims of financially irresponsible drivers. Kansas was, 
this time, the 45th state to adopt the broader, more modern, 
security-type law. 
The purpose of this study is threefold: (I) to 
examine the major provisions of the 1958 Kansas Motor Vehicle 
Safety Responsibility Act, (2) to summarize the activities of 
the administration and enforcement of the Act during its 
first eight years of existence, and (3) to show that the Act 
has served the purpose for which it was intended. The object 
of the paper is not meant to be an exhaustive interpretation 
of the Act in light of the judicial construction of other 
states, but rather to be an informative resume of the Act in 
terms that the layman, who is the most frequent recipient of 
the benefits and penalties of its provisions, can understand. 
2R 
obert H. Burtis, "The Operation of the Kansas 
Financial Responsibility Law," 9 Kansas Bar Journal (May, 
1941), p. 367. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY 
The 1939 Law1 
The Kansas Financial Responsibility Law adopted in 
1939 provided for the suspension of drivers' licenses in 
cases of conviction of certain traffic offenses involving 
the use of a motor vehicle, and in cases of civil suits 
arising out of automobile accidents where judgments rendered 
against the offending motorist went unsatisfied for longer 
than thirty days. In cases of conviction of certain traffic 
violations, the operator also was required to furnish proof 
of future financial responsibility before his license could 
be restored. In cases of a civil suit resulting in a judg- 
ment against the wrongdoer, the suspension remained in effect 
until the judgment debtor paid the judgment and filed proof 
of future financial responsibility. Reinstatement of the 
driver's license or vehicle registration could be made by the 
Motor Vehicle Department at the end of three years, regard- 
less of whether the judgment, if any, had been satisfied. 
Through the enactment of the Financial Responsibility 
Law it was hoped that a large number of dangerous, negligent, 
and irresponsible motorists would be removed from the highways 
1 Kans. G.S. 1949, 8-701 to 8-717, 8-719 to 8-721; G.S. 
1955 Supp. 8-718. 
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by suspension of their driving privileges and vehicle regis- 
trations. This would not only reduce the number of accidents, 
but would make it more likely that those persons who used the 
roads would be those who were better able to pay damages 
assessed against them for personal injury or property damage 
arising from traffic accidents. Robert H. Burtis, attorney 
for the Financial Responsibility Division of the Motor Vehicle 
Department, wrote in 1941, two years after the enactment of 
the Law: "The purpose of the Law, it is said, is to promote 
safety on the highways by removing those who have clearly 
demonstrated their dangerous tendencies as drivers."2 
As a means of achieving the desired objective, this 
law had two serious drawbacks which stringently curtailed its 
effectiveness. First, the suspension of a driver's license 
or vehicle registration did not become effective until the 
offending motorist had defaulted on a judgment resulting from 
a motor vehicle accident, or had been convicted for a certain 
type of traffic offense. Because of the difficulty of col- 
lecting judgments from financially irresponsible persons, 
many victims of financially irresponsible motorists may have 
been reluctant to undertake a suit for damages if it appeared 
that they would simply be "throwing good money after bad" by 
incurring attorney fees and other legal costs. Under these 
circumstances, it was possible for a motorist to be involved 
2 
Burtis, loc. cit. 
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in one or more accidents without ever coming under the 
sanctions of the Financial Responsibility Law. Second, the 
offending motorist was not required to compensate his first 
victim; thus originated the nickname "first-bite" law. This 
meant simply that no security was required to compensate the 
first victim. Although Mr. Burtis did not seem particularly 
concerned about these obvious defects, he did express concern 
that the law was perhaps not achieving the results aimed at 
through its objective. He wrote: 
The true function of the Financial Responsibility Law 
is to require a selected group of drivers to show 
proof of their ability to respond in damages for 
future accidents, or to secure the payment of past 
damage, or both. It has to some extent accomplished 
this function. It is inaccurate to term it a safety 
measure in the sense of diminishing the number of 
accidents, for the terms of the Law do not apply to 
a broad enough group of drivers to achieve its avowed 
objective; in practice, it does not reach a large 
proportion of persons to whom it does apply in terms. 
The chief fault lies not with the operation of the 
Law itself but with the objective which has been set 
for it to accomplish. To secure safe highways free 
from dangerous and negligent drivers will require a 
system of driver-regulation much more comprehensive 
than that which is now in effect.3 
Proof versus Security 
The 1939 Kansas Financial Responsibility Law was of a 
class termed "proof-type" because no security was required to 
compensate the victim of the first accident; it merely re- 
quired proof of future financial responsibility. In order to 
3 
Ibid., p. 372. 
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overcome the shortcomings inherent in the old law, and as a 
means of increasing the incentive for motorists to acquire 
financial responsibility before becoming involved in an 
accident, proposals were considered by the Kansas legislature 
which included a so-called "security" provision.4 Briefly 
stated, the security provision requires a report to the 
vehicle department by those who are involved in traffic 
accidents in which any person is killed or injured, or in 
which damage to the property of any one person exceeds a 
specified amount. On the basis of the accident report, the 
vehicle department determines the amount of security which it 
deems sufficient to satisfy any judgment or judgments for 
damages which may be recovered against each operator or owner 
of a vehicle in any manner involved in the accident. Each 
operator or owner must then either furnish security in the 
amount determined by the department, show that an automobile 
liability policy of a specified amount was in effect at the 
time of the accident with respect to the motor vehicle in- 
volved in the accident, or else qualify as a self-insurer. 5 
4 
Security-type laws are frequently designated as 
"safety responsibility" laws, in order to distinguish them 
from the older type financial responsibility law. 
5Liberally defined, a self-insurer is one who has 
shown to the satisfaction of the vehicle department an 
ability to pay judgments obtained against him, and has been 
issued a certificate of self-insurance by the department. 
8 
Failure to do so results in the suspension of the person's 
driver's license or vehicle registration. 
Legislative History 
Security-type financial responsibility legislation was 
considered by the Kansas legislature in the 1949, 1951, 1953, 
and 1955 sessions: 
In 1949, the bill was recommended for passage by the 
committee to which it was referred in the house of 
its origin but died on the calendar. In 1951 and 1955, 
the bill died in the committee to which it was refer- 
red in the house of origin. In 1953, the bill was 
passed by both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate near the close of the session. However, the 
Senate had made several amendments to the House ver- 
sion, upon which conference committees could not reach 
agreement, and the bill died in conference. 
A barrier to the passage of security-type financial 
responsibility legislation in Kansas in recent years 
has been the controversy over the question of includ- 
ing in the law the doctrine of comparative negligence. 
A section embodying this doctrine, which was added by 
the Senate in 1953, constituted the chief source of 
disagreement over the bill between the House and 
Senate in that session. Reportedly, it was again con- 
troversy over this issue which was responsible for the 
bill's dying in the committee in 1955.0 
6 
"Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Laws," Kansas 
Legislative Council, Pub. No. 204, Sept., 1956, p. 10. The 
doctrine of comparative negligence is that a plaintiff may 
not be barred from recovering damages simply because it has 
been shown that his own negligence contributed to the cause 
of the accident, but whatever damages are awarded to him 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to him. The enactment of legislation embodying 
this principle would in effect repeal the common law prin- 
cipal, recognized in Kansas today, that, if it can be shown 
that negligence of the plaintiff was a contributing factor 
in causing the accident, he may not recover damages. 
9 
In 1957, the legislature which was then in session 
enacted the Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act7 
which, in addition to the inclusion of security provisions, 
retained the principal features of the "proof-type" law, 
i.e., the requirement of proof of future financial responsi- 
bility in case of conviction of certain traffic offenses or 
failure to satisfy a judgment arising out of a motor vehicle 
accident. This legislation became law on January 1, 1958. 
Definitions 
The remainder of this study will be concerned primarily 
with, and confined to, the provisions of the Safety Responsi- 
bility Act in its present form. 
Hereinafter, the term "Act" and "Law" refer to the 
1958 Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and the term 
"department" refers specifically to the Motor Vehicle Depart- 
ment of the State Highway Commission. The term "reportable 
accident" means a motor vehicle accident involving injury to, 
or death of, any person, or damage to the property of any one 
person in excess of one hundred dollars. 
7 
K.S.A. 8-722 to 8-769. 
CHAPTER III 
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT 
January 1, 1958 
Before commencing a detailed discussion of the various 
provisions and aspects of the Act, it should be pointed out 
that the Act is divided into two distinct parts; the first 
part pertains to the deposit of security, while the second 
part deals with proof of financial responsibility for the 
future. It should likewise be pointed out that parts of the 
Act apply not only to those involved in motor vehicle acci- 
dents, but also to those persons convicted of certain traffic 
law violations. Primary emphasis will be given in this paper 
to the provisions relating to motor vehicle accidents. 
It might be said there are three duties that a motorist 
is expected to discharge, and if there is no breach of any of 
these duties the question of financial responsibility will 
not be raised. Stated briefly, the motorist is expected to 
(1) obey the law, (2) satisfy judgments, and (3) avoid acci- 
dents.' The first duty is assumed of all mature drivers, but 
the recalcitrant minority who repeatedly break the law will, 
sooner or later, come within the provisions of the Act. The 
second duty can be much more difficult to discharge than the 
1 
Calvin H. Brainard, Automobile Insurance (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961), pp. 416-17. 
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first as it often requires a great deal of care, with luck 
not to be overlooked, to avoid an act that may result in a 
judgment for damages because of negligence liability. As 
will be shown in greater detail later, the failure to satisfy 
a judgment also is grounds for bringing the judgment debtor 
within the scope of the Act. "Negligence is tolerated if one 
has the ability to pay for its consequences, and lack of finan- 
cial responsibility is tolerated if one is not negligent. But 
to be both negligent and lacking in financial responsibility 
is not to be countenanced."2 The last duty to discharge is 
probably the most difficult of all as the most careful and 
prudent operator of an automobile may find it utterly impos- 
sible to avoid accidents caused by the negligence of others, 
or from circumstances beyond his control. However, since the 
Act does not differentiate fault from no-fault, this motorist 
may also be arbitrarily brought within its scope. 
This analysis will begin with the last of the duties 
mentioned above; that of accident avoidance. 
Motorists Involved in Accidents 
The Act applies to the driver and owner of any vehicle 
subject to registration which is in any manner involved in an 
accident within the state, provided the accident results in 
bodily injury to, or death of, any person, or results in 
damage to the property of any one person in excess of one 
12 
hundred dollars.3 It is not necessary for a vehicle to be in 
motion, or have any physical contact with the property 
damaged. The Act applies to any vehicle which is "in any 
manner" involved. For example, if the driver of car A pulled 
into the path of car B, causing the driver of car B to swerve 
and subsequently strike a telephone pole, the driver of car A 
would be "involved" regardless of the fact there was no actual 
contact between the vehicles of A and B. To come under the 
sanction of the Act, all that is necessary as far as the 
Safety Responsibility Division of the Motor Vehicle Department 
is concerned, is that a report of accident be filed by any 
one participant of an accident naming any other person as 
having in any way contributed to, or been a part of, the 
accident. 
After an accident has occurred, each driver or owner 
is required to forward a written report to the Motor Vehicle 
Department within twenty-four hours. This requirement is not 
found within the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, but 
rather is found in the "Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on 
Highways." 4 This has led to the conclusion by the Motor 
Vehicle Department, Safety Responsibility Division, that the 
Act makes no provision for reporting of accidents to the 
department, and therefore invokes no penalty for not reporting 
3 
K.S.A. 8-725. 
4 
K.S.A. 8-523. 
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an accident to it. This fact notwithstanding, any person 
involved in an accident is subject to the provisions of the 
Act so long as he has been named by any other person involved 
in the accident who has filed a written report. His only 
relief is that there is no penalty such as fine or imprison- 
ment for the failure to report. 
The accident report is to be made on a form furnished 
by the Motor Vehicle Department (Appendix A), and is not to 
be confused with any accident report required by state or 
local law enforcement agencies. However, as a matter of 
convenience, the forms required by the Safety Responsibility 
Division are furnished to law enforcement officers to be 
given to those persons involved in motor vehicle accidents. 
Security Requirements 
On the accident report form the driver is asked to 
complete an insurance information section and give answers to 
such questions as name of insurance company, policy number, 
selling agent and so forth. If an automobile liability 
policy with minimum statutory limits of $10,000/$20,000 bodily 
injury and $5,000 property damage was in effect at the time 
of the accident, the driver is deemed to be financially re- 
sponsible for whatever damage he may be charged with under 
common law negligence, and the security requirements will not 
apply to him.5 On the other hand, if no insurance was in 
5 
A copy of this section of the report is sent to the 
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effect, the question of his financial responsibility will be 
raised through the requirement for deposit of security. 
As was previously pointed out, the requirement of 
security applies indiscriminately both to drivers and owners, 
regardless of fault. Upon the expiration of twenty days 
after the department receives the accident report, it deter- 
mines the amount of security which it feels will be sufficient 
to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damage resulting 
from the accident which may be recovered against each owner 
or driver involved. 6 
Security requirements are determined by trained evalu- 
ators working in the Safety Responsibility Division of the 
Motor Vehicle Department who evaluate each reported accident 
for bodily injuries and property damage. The evaluators work 
from the accident report, police report, injury charts, auto- 
mobile repair manuals, and used car valuation guide books to 
determine as accurately as possible the dollar value to be 
assigned to each injury and each item of property damaged. 
The total valuation which has been determined for all injury 
and damage caused by any one vehicle becomes the amount of 
security required by the owner or driver of that vehicle. 
involved insurance company by the department for certifica- 
tion of coverage. If the company does not return the copy 
as "rejected," with the reason stated, within a reasonable 
length of time, the department assumes that coverage is in 
force. 
6 
K.S.A. 8-726. 
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For example, if the driver of car A strikes B's car and 
injures B, and if the accident report indicates the damage to 
A's car to be $150 and the damage to B's car $250, and if B 
received a slight laceration while A was uninjured, then the 
amount of security that B is required to submit to the depart- 
ment will be $150, while the amount of security required of A 
will be some amount in excess of the $250 property damage, the 
total requirement being dependent on the dollar amount affixed 
to the case by the evaluator for the injury of B. 
Admittedly, the evaluation of accident cases involves 
some degree of estimation and guesswork. However, in order 
to remain as completely free of subjectivity as possible, no 
consideration is given, in evaluating injuries, to probable or 
possible loss of work, pain and suffering, and permanent dis- 
ability. In spite of this limitation, the system does provide 
a reasonable approximation of the damages that might be 
assessed against the involved driver in a civil suit. The 
department evaluates each case solely on the basis of the 
injury and property damage, and apparent lack of fault on the 
part of either driver will not mitigate the amount of security 
required. 
After the amount of security required from any owner 
or driver involved in an accident has been determined, the 
department will, within fifty days after receiving the acci- 
dent report, notify the involved person by registered or 
certified mail of the amount of security required of him 
16 
(Appendix B). The person is informed by this notice that 
unless security is deposited with the department within 
twenty days, the driver's license of the driver and/or all 
vehicle tags and registration receipts of the owner will be 
suspended. 
Security Compliance 
The responsibility for complying with the security 
requirements of the Act rests with the individual owner or 
driver, and it is up to him to submit proof of his financial 
responsibility before the suspension date in order to protect 
his driving and/or registration privileges. The Act provides 
that security shall be in the form required by the department, 
and the department has approved six methods for an individual 
to comply. Compliance through any one form will satisfy the 
requirements. First, the offender may show, through the 
accident report form, that he had in force at the time of the 
accident, automobile liability insurance coverage protecting 
the owner or driver,7 written through a company authorized to 
do business in the state, and with minimum liability limits 
of $10,000 bodily injury per person, $20,000 bodily injury 
limit per accident, and $5,000 property damage coverage per 
accident.8 
7 K.S.A. 8-728. 
8 
K.S.A. 1965 Supp. 8-729. It is well to make the point 
at this time that liability insurance is not compulsory or 
required by law; it merely is one method of satisfying the 
security requirement. 
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Secolid, security may be posted through certified check, 
money order, or bank draft.9 Third, a notarized Release of 
Liability from each adverse party involved may be sent to the 
department by the offender. Fourth, a judgment of non- 
liability may be made in a court hearing in a suit for the 
recovery of damages and filed with the department. Fifth, an 
agreement may be made to make installment payments on a court 
judgment for damages. Sixth, an agreement may be made with 
each adverse party involved to make installment payments of 
an agreed amount. However, any default on the payments of 
this agreement will result in an immediate order of suspension 
of the license or registration certificate of the defaulter. 
Any person who feels that the security he is obligated 
to submit as proof of his financial responsibility is too 
high may request a hearing before a hearing's officer in the 
department. 10 If it can be shown to the satisfaction of the 
department that the amount of security ordered was excessive, 
it may, if within six months of the date of accident, reduce 
9 Prior to September 8, 1965, security also could be 
posted by corporate surety or real estate bond. However, the 
Highway Commission adopted a policy that the Motor Vehicle 
Department should not accept any form of bonds, either cor- 
porate or real estate, in connection with a security deposit 
for an accident. The legality of the State's decision was 
tested in 1966 in the District Court of Shawnee County in re 
United Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Motor Vehicle 
Department, State of Kansas. Decision was rendered in favor 
of the defendant. 
10 
K.S.A. 8.723. 
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the security requirement. 11 However, the department has no 
authority to increase the amount of security required once 
the notice of security requirement has been sent to the 
offender. 
Failure to Deposit Security 
While the purchase of automobile liability insurance 
coverage would appear to be the simplest way of complying 
with the security requirement, it is frivolous to assume that 
all persons who own or drive an automobile will purchase in- 
surance merely because it is the most convenient way of com- 
plying with the Act. Elderly people existing on a meager 
budget may feel that they cannot afford to pay the premium on 
an insurance policy. The immature of all ages often fail to 
see any value or significance in an intangible like insurance. 
Young persons owning their very first automobile often find 
that the annual premium for liability insurance equals or 
exceeds the value of the used car they are driving. Since 
the law does not require the purchase of liability insurance 
as a prerequisite to registration, it is clearly understand- 
able why a small minority of uninsured motorists will always 
exist. 
If there is no automobile liability insurance coverage 
in force at the time of the accident, we have seen that the 
driver or owner may meet the security requirement by posting 
11 K.S.A. 8-734. 
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certified check, money order, or bank draft with the depart- 
ment in the amount required. This may not be too difficult 
for most people if the accident is very minor in nature and 
the amount of required security is nominal. However, due in 
part to present high-speed, powerful automobiles, many acci- 
dents occur which result in very serious injuries, and even 
death, to one or more persons. In a case such as this, the 
involved driver may be required to deposit security for as 
much as $25,000, depending on the number of persons injured 
and the extent of their injuries and property damage. It is 
apparent that the burden, for most people at least, of rais- 
ing $25,000 in cash within the twenty-day statutory period 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
If the involved driver has no insurance and cannot 
deposit the required security, he has the privilege of sub- 
mitting a Release of Liability to the department from each 
adverse party involved. In this day of legal technicalities, 
it is not likely that injured parties will readily release 
him even though he was not at fault. In fact, an injured 
party whose vehicle was damaged generally should not execute 
a Release because of the possibility of violating the subro- 
gation conditions of his collision insurance policy.12 
12 The condition relating to subrogation states that if 
any payment is made under the policy, the Company becomes 
subrogated to all of the insured's rights of recovery against 
any person or organization, and the insured shall do nothing 
after a loss to prejudice such rights. If an insured signs 
20 
In a serious accident involving many persons it is 
unlikely that the involved driver will be able to sign agree- 
ments with all for the payment of damages in installments. 
Chances are that seriously injured persons will not be willing 
to sign any agreement for several months following an acci- 
dent, at least until the extent of their injuries is known. 
Remembering that the department will issue a notice of suspen- 
sion if security is not posted within twenty days after it has 
been demanded, it is apparent that the offender's lack of 
success in obtaining these agreements will result in his sus- 
pension. 
The two methods of satisfying security requirements 
through a judgment of non-liability or through an agreement 
to pay a judgment in installments involve litigation. With 
the courts already clogged with civil suits, a motorist stands 
very little chance of having his case adjudicated within the 
twenty-day statutory time period allowed for the deposit of 
security. 
It becomes obvious, for the reasons given above, that 
all drivers or owners involved in accidents are not able to 
comply with the security requirement. If the involved driver 
fails without just cause to deposit the required security 
within twenty days after the department has sent the security 
away his rights through a release, he also signs away his 
company's rights at the same time because an insured can 
assign (to his company) no more or no better rights than he 
himself has. 
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notice, he is considered financially irresponsible for his 
acts, and his suspension is automatic. He will lose his 
driving privilege even though he might not have a driver's 
license in force at the time of the accident. Furthermore, 
registration privileges are suspended for any owner who does 
not comply, and all of the owner's registration receipts and 
vehicle tags must be surrendered to the department." The 
department serves notice to the offender through an "Order of 
Suspension" letter which is mailed to him (Appendix C). In 
the event that the offender does not immediately surrender 
his license and/or registration voluntarily, the department 
is authorized to direct any peace officer to secure possession 
of the license and registration and return them to the depart- 
ment.14 The Motor Vehicle Department itself maintains a staff 
of ten investigators whose job is to seek out violators of the 
surrender order and make the pick-up of license and registra- 
tion for the department. 
Duration of Suspension 
Once the suspension order has been put into effect and 
the driver has lost all driving privileges, the suspension 
will continue in effect until all requirements of the Act 
have been met. Termination of the requirement of security, 
and thus suspension since there would be no suspension if the 
13 K.S.A. 8-727. 
14 
K.S.A. 8-760. 
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security requirement had been met, may be had in one of 
several ways: (1) the person is finally released from lia- 
bility by all injured parties or has been finally adjudicated 
free from fault,15 (2) a written agreement is made with the 
judgment creditor to pay an agreed amount (the payment may be 
made in installments)," (3) the amount of security required 
is deposited, or one year has elapsed since the date of sus- 
pension and satisfactory evidence (Appendix D) is filed with 
the department showing that during the one-year period no 
action for damages arising out of the accident was filed 
against the person required to post the security.17 
Custody, Disposition,18 and Return of Security19 
The monies which are paid to the department to meet 
security requirements are placed in the custody of the State 
Treasurer and are held for the payment of any judgment that 
may arise against the person for whom the deposit was made. 
It is necessary, of course, that the judgment shall have 
arisen out of the accident which created the requirement of 
deposit in the first place. The act has a self-contained 
statute of limitations which requires that the legal action 
(for judgment) be instituted within one year after the deposit 
was made or the security will be returned to the depositor. 
Although certainly not totally ineffective because of this 
15 K.S.A. 8-731. 
18 K.S.A. 8-736. 
16 K.S.A. 8-732. 
19 K.S.A. 8-737. 
17 K.S.A. 8-735. 
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one-year limitation, the Act does seem somewhat weakened 
because of its inconsistency with the two-year statute of 
limitation for the bringing of a tort action for damages in 
a civil suit. 
Example: A was involved in an accident with B wherein 
B suffered injury to his person and damage to his 
automobile. A was uninsured and posted the amount of 
security required by the department in the form of 
cash. No suit for damages was filed by B against A 
within twelve months of the accident, and the security 
deposited by A was returned to him. Twenty months 
after the accident, B filed suit against A and obtained 
a judgment. However, the security that was returned 
to A has since been spent, and A is now no longer 
financially able to pay the judgment. B has, in effect, 
a judgment that is uncollectible. 
If the period for the release of security were extended 
to two years, it would assure that persons injured or damaged 
in an accident would be more likely to have a claim or judg- 
ment satisfied since the extension would bring the deposit 
period into better alignment with the statute of limitations. 
However, the deficiency is overcome in part by the fact that 
A, in the example above, would still be required to satisfy 
the judgment within sixty days or become subject to suspension 
of his license and registration certificate. 
The Act contains rather elaborate provisions for the 
disposition of security, but provides, in effect, that pri- 
ority will be given the judgment creditors and claimants who 
have agreed to settle their claims, to the extent that the 
claims were evaluated by the department. The amount paid to 
each judgment creditor and claimant will not exceed the 
amount fixed by the department in each evaluation. 
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If there is any balance of the security remaining 
after distribution to those persons who have agreed to settle 
their claims, the amount will be returned to the depositor 
provided (1) there is no litigation pending against him as a 
result of the accident, and (2) there is no judgment against 
him which has not been satisfied. 
Exemptions to Security Requirements 
In a case where a person subject to the provisions of 
the Act is completely innocent, the requirements may seem 
harsh. Therefore, the innocent party is expressly excepted 
from the requirement of security in certain situations. The 
requirements as to security and suspension do not apply to 
the driver or the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident 
where no injury or damage was caused to the person or property 
of anyone other than the operator or owner. Another exception 
applies to the driver or owner of a vehicle that was legally 
parked at the time of the accident, while still another ex- 
ception applies to the owner of a vehicle if at the time of 
the accident the vehicle was being operated without his per- 
mission, express or implied, or was parked by a person who had 
been operating the vehicle without such permission." 
In addition to the above, the Act does not apply to 
vehicles owned by the United States, the State of Kansas or 
20 
K.S.A. 8-730. 
25 
any political subdivision or municipality within the state.21 
However, since this section of the Act pertains to ownership 
exclusively, it follows that drivers of vehicles owned by the 
state, political subdivisions or municipalities are not ex- 
cluded, and are therefore subject to the requirements. 
Owners and operators of vehicles which are exempt from 
registration also are exempt from the provisions of the Act. 
Such vehicles include farm tractors, road rollers and road 
machinery temporarily operated or moved upon the highways, 
municipally owned fire trucks, school buses owned and operated 
by a school district, and self-propelled construction equip- 
ment. Drivers and owners involved in accidents which occur 
on United States government property also are exempt. 
Unsatisfied Judgments 
Up to this point, the analysis has centered around the 
operation of the security requirement against those motorists 
who are unfortunate enough to become involved in an automobile 
accident. The second duty expected of a motorist is to sat- 
isfy all judgments which may be a result of such an accident 
and, as in the case of failing to meet security requirements, 
the Act likewise imposes penalties of suspension for failure 
to satisfy any judgment within sixty days. If a claimant 
obtains a judgment against the driver of the adverse vehicle, 
it is his, or his attorney's, duty to make written request to 
21 
K.S.A. 8-762. 
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the clerk of the court to have a copy of the judgment sent to 
the department. 22 As soon as this information is received by 
the department, the license and registration of the judgment 
debtor will be suspended immediately." The suspension will 
remain in effect unless and until the judgment is stayed24 or 
is satisfied to the extent that $5,000 has been paid because 
of bodily injury to, or death of, any one person, $10,000 has 
been paid because of bodily injury to, or death of, two or 
more persons as the result of any one accident, or when $1,000 
has been paid because of property damage resulting from one 
accident. 25 There is inconsistency in the law at this point 
since the Act allows no insurance policy to be effective to 
satisfy security requirements unless the liability limits meet 
the minimum coverage of 10/20/5. On the other hand, suspen- 
sion may be avoided by the judgment debtor provided he is 
able to make any payment for bodily injury and property damage 
up to a total of 5/10/1, even if the judgment is in excess of 
these amounts. While payments to this extent are sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of the Act, and while such judg- 
ments are deemed satisfied for the purpose of the Act, the 
judgment debtor, at law, is required to pay the entire amount 
of the judgment. For instance, if B, C, and D obtain sub- 
stantial judgments against A as a result of a very serious 
22 
K.S.A. 8-742. 23 K.S.A. 8-743. 
24 K.S.A. 8-744. 25 K.S.A. 8-745. 
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accident, A can protect his driving privileges by making a 
total payment of $11,000 even though the combined judgment 
may total $50,000 or more. However, each individual judgment 
will not be deemed satisfied by the court unless and until 
payment is made in full to each judgment creditor. 
The Act provides that a discharge in bankruptcy follow- 
ing the rendering of any judgment shall not relieve the judg- 
ment debtor from any of the requirements of the Act.26 In a 
Utah case decided in 1962, the U. S. Supreme Court held that 
the police power of a state to suspend does not conflict with 
the Bankruptcy Act, which states that a discharge in bank- 
ruptcy will release the bankruptfrom all his provable debts, 
whether allowable in full or in part.27 The only legal way 
for a bankrupt to regain his driver's license or registration 
certificate is to pay the judgment against him. 
Traffic Law Violations 
The first duty of all drivers is to obey the traffic 
laws of the state. A mature, responsible motorist does not 
flagrantly ignore or purposely violate the traffic regulations 
which have been designed primarily for his own safety. How- 
ever, for those drivers who recklessly and habitually break 
traffic regulations the law has imposed certain penalties. 
In addition to being subject to fines, imprisonment, or both, 
26 
K.S.A. 8-744. 
27 
Kessler v. Department of Public Safety 369 U.S. 153, 
82 S. Ct. 807, 7 L. Ed. 2d 641 T1962). 
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the reckless driver can expect suspension of his driver's 
license in certain instances. The uniform traffic law 
requires mandatory revocation in any case where the driver 
is convicted of (1) negligent homicide, (2) driving while 
intoxicated, (3) leaving the scene of an accident where there 
is personal injury, (4) three charges of reckless driving 
committed within a twelve-month period, or (5) use of an 
automobile in the commission of a felony.28 
While this section of the Kansas Motor Vehicle Laws 
has no direct bearing to security requirements or unsatisfied 
judgments, it does become important to the section of the 
Safety Responsibility Act dealing with proof of future finan- 
cial responsibility. This will be dealt with in much greater 
detail in the next section, and it is only important now to 
be cognizant of the fact that conviction of certain traffic 
violations can result in suspension and revocation of a 
driver's license. 
Proof of Financial Responsibility 
Security is a deposit of cash (certified check, money 
order, or bank draft) as evidence of financial responsibility 
for a past accident in which the depositor was not covered by 
automobile liability insurance. Proof is the filing of evi- 
dence by owner or driver that he is financially able to 
respond to any claim for damages that may arise from a future 
28 
K.S.A. 8-254. 
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accident. The Act defines the term as "Proof of ability to 
respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents 
occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof, 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor 
vehicle . . . ."29 
Under the Act, proof is required in two situations: 
(1) As one of the prerequisites for restoration when license 
and registration have been suspended because of a failure to 
satisfy a judgment within sixty days, 30 and (2) for those 
convicted of serious traffic violations as one of the condi- 
tions precedent to the restoration of the suspended operator's 
license and registration. 31 Concerning the first situation, 
a reminder would appear to be in order. Driving privileges 
are not restored merely because proof is filed; the judgment 
must also be satisfied. It is only fitting that the Act 
should operate in this fashion since, obviously, the fact 
that a judgment has been rendered against a motorist indicates 
injury or damage to a third party as a result of the judgment 
debtor's negligence. And inability to pay a judgment should 
properly restrain a motorist from driving until the judgment 
has been paid and proof has been shown that he is financially 
able to pay for a future accident. 
The most glaring weakness of this aspect of the Act is 
that few injury victims, and still fewer contingency-fee 
29 
K.S.A. 8-740. 3 °K.S.A. 8-744. 
31 
K.S.A. 1965 Supp. 8-739. 
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lawyers, will incur the time and expense of an action for 
damages against a financially irresponsible tortfeasor. In 
most cases, then, no judgment will be taken, and no proof 
will be required. It must be remembered, however, that this 
weakness is offset in part by the security provisions of the 
Act, under which, as already noted, a driver's license and 
vehicle registration can be suspended on the mere occurrence 
of an accident and failure to deposit security, regardless of 
whether a judgment is recovered. But the security provisions 
arising as a result of an accident do not require proof for 
the future. As an illustration, let us assume that John Brown 
and Richard Smith, each driving his own car, were involved in 
an accident, and Smith received rather extensive injuries. 
Assume further that the proximate cause of the accident was 
Brown's negligent operation of his automobile. Both drivers 
made a report of the accident to the Motor Vehicle Department, 
and Smith's damages were evaluated by the department at 
$2,500. Brown, being financially irresponsible, was unable 
to post security and accordingly lost his driver's license and 
automobile registration. What happens next is entirely de- 
pendent on what course of action Smith decides to take. (1) 
If Smith sues and obtains a $2,500 judgment against Brown 
(which Brown cannot satisfy because his lack of financial 
responsibility makes him "judgment proof"), Brown's driving 
privileges will not be restored until the judgment is satis- 
fied and proof of future financial responsibility furnished. 
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(2) If Smith decides not to sue, since it appears he would 
only be throwing good money after bad, Brown will regain his 
driving privileges after only one year without any require- 
ment of proof of future financial responsibility. 
In a case such as that just cited, the negligent driver 
is allowed to return to the highway without any greater finan- 
cial responsibility than before. In this respect the law 
appears based on the false assumption that if a judgment is 
not taken against the operator, he was not at fault and should 
be allowed to resume driving. Part of this weakness could be 
overcome by requiring the filing of proof as a part of the 
security provisions, thereby requiring a person who has had a 
reportable accident, and is unable to post security, to 
furnish proof for the future in order to recover his driving 
privileges at the end of the one-year suspension period. 
The requirement for maintaining proof will be termi- 
nated (1) if the person required to furnish proof dies, (2) if 
the person required to furnish proof surrenders his license 
and registration to the department, or (3) after two years 
from the date proof was required, provided the person required 
to furnish proof was not convicted of a traffic violation 
during the two-year period which would permit or require sus- 
pension, or did not have an accident resulting in injury or 
damage to property of others within the previous year.32 
32 
K.S.A. 8-758. 
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The Act requires that the amount of proof furnished 
shall be in the amount of $5,000 because of bodily injury to, 
or death of, one person in any one accident; in the amount of 
$10,000 because of bodily injury to, or death of, two or more 
persons in any one accident and in the amount of $1,000 be- 
cause of property damage resulting from any one accident.33 
The Act further provides four alternatives for the furnishing 
of proof: (1) filing an automobile liability insurance pol- 
icy, (2) filing a corporate surety or real estate bond, (3) 
a deposit of money or securities, or (4) qualification as a 
self-insurer.34 The most common method of satisfying the 
proof requirement is, of course, by the acquisition of an 
automobile liability insurance policy. 
The Act explicitly states (K.S.A. 8-750) that the 
limits of coverage required under an insurance policy to meet 
the proof requirement are $5,000/$10,000/$1,000. It is also 
explicit in stating (K.S.A. 8-754) that proof of financial 
responsibility may be evidenced by the deposit with the State 
Treasurer the sum of $11,000 in cash or securities. With 
this in mind, it appears that the proof requirement of 5/10/1 
is in conflict with the security requirement of 10/20/5. For 
instance, assume that John Doe, who is uninsured, was involved 
in an automobile accident with Richard Roe wherein Doe 
33 
K.S.A. 8-740. 
34 
K.S.A. 8-747. 
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negligently caused injury and damage to the person and 
property of Roe. Shortly thereafter, Roe sued Doe and ob- 
tained a judgment against him. The judgment went unsatisfied 
for sixty days, the department was notified of such, and Doe's 
driving privileges were immediately suspended.35 A short time 
later Doe came into some money, paid the judgment, and re- 
quested reinstatement of his driving privileges. He complied 
with the proof requirement by purchasing an automobile lia- 
bility insurance policy with limits of 5/10/1. A few days 
later he was involved in another accident which resulted in 
property damage in excess of $100. This time he submitted 
his insurance policy as evidence of his financial responsi- 
bility to meet the security requirement, but again found his 
license and registration suspended because the security pro- 
visions of the Act require that an insurance policy, to be 
effective, must have limits of not less than 10/20/5. In an 
instance such as this, it seems that the proof requirement, 
which is designed to show proof of ability to respond to 
damages arising from future accidents, leaves a gap between 
proof and security which is not adequately bridged. 
35 
Chances are, Doe was unable to meet 
requirement and had his license suspended for 
However, even though security had been deposi 
sible that the judgment was in excess of the 
giving rise to suspension if the whole amount 
was not paid in sixty days. 
the security 
that cause. 
ted, it is pos- 
amount posted 
of the judgment 
34 
Reinstatement 
If any driver or owner of a vehicle involved in a 
reportable accident fails to meet the security requirements, 
he is subject to suspension of driver's license and/or regis- 
tration receipts and tags after the statutory period of twenty 
days following the sending of the security notice by the de- 
partment has elapsed. It has already been noted that an owner 
or driver can meet the security requirements, and apply for 
reinstatement if suspension has already taken effect, by post- 
ing security, obtaining signed releases from adverse parties, 
signing an agreement to pay in installments an agreed amount, 
obtaining a final judgment of non-liability, or submitting an 
affidavit one year from the suspension date showing that no 
lawsuit is pending. 
If any of the above conditions are met, the owner of 
the involved vehicle will have his registration and vehicle 
tags returned to him. On the other hand, a suspended driver, 
in order to gain reinstatement of his driver's license, must 
pass a driver's examination unless such an examination was 
taken and passed within the two-year period prior to suspen- 
sion. Furthermore, if the driver's license was not surren- 
dered to the department prior to the expiration of the twenty- 
day period, the driver is required to pay a $25.00 reinstate- 
ment fee before he may be reinstated. These requirements of 
the driver are in addition to satisfaction of the requirements 
already noted. 
35 
Reciprocity 
Prior to July 1, 1965, the Kansas Act had no provision 
regarding reciprocity agreements with other states when non- 
residents were involved in accidents on Kansas highways. 
However, as the law now stands, any state having a safety 
responsibility act similar to that of Kansas may simply notify 
the Kansas Motor Vehicle Department that a Kansas resident 
involved in an accident in that state failed to meet security 
requirements of that state. Upon receipt of certification of 
this fact, the department will suspend the license and/or 
registration of the offender in the same manner as if he had 
been involved in an accident in Kansas and failed to meet the 
security requirements. The suspension will remain in effect 
until the resident furnishes evidence of his compliance with 
the law of the other state relating to the deposit of secur- 
ity. 36 The same procedure will hold true for residents of a 
reciprocal state who are involved in accidents in Kansas. 
At the end of 1965, Kansas had reciprocity agreements 
with forty-four states, but the department had processed no 
cases under reciprocity at that time. Although the largest 
specific drawback to reciprocity between states concerning the 
Safety Responsibility Act is the lack of uniformity concerning 
limits of liability, such agreements can be extremely bene- 
ficial in the overall plan of ridding the nation's highways of 
financially irresponsible motorists. 
36K.S.A. 1965 Supp. 8-733a. 
CHAPTER IV 
ASSIGNED RISK PLAN 
When insurance is required, even though not mandatory 
or compulsory, as a condition of a safety responsibility law, 
it is obvious that the needed insurance must be made avail- 
able to all eligible persons who wish to purchase it. How- 
ever, it is equally obvious that, from an insurance under- 
writer's standpoint, not all persons who have the money and 
wish to buy insurance are eligible. For example, such persons 
as under-age drivers, habitual traffic violators, heavy 
drinkers, and those with a record of frequent accidents, are 
not normally considered good insurance risks, and would prob- 
ably find it most difficult to obtain insurance through regu- 
lar channels. If insurers were generally to refuse insurance 
coverage to these undesirable categories of risks when the 
law states that insurance may be carried to avoid the penal- 
ties of the Safety Responsibility Act, the state would prob- 
ably then be forced to coerce insurers into accepting them, 
or else establish state insurance funds. To avoid both 
measures, assigned risk plans have been developed whereby 
risks possessing undesirable underwriting characteristics are 
shared by insurers in accordance with some equitable plan of 
centralized distribution. 
The Kansas Automobile Assigned Risk Plan became effec- 
tive on November 20, 1950. The purpose of the plan is to 
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make automobile bodily injury and property damage liability 
insurance available to risks unable to secure it for them- 
selves, and to establish a procedure for the equitable distri- 
bution of risks assigned to insurance companies. 
Since it is not the purpose of this study to present a 
detailed analysis of the Assigned Risk Plan in its entirety, 
it will be deemed sufficient at this time to make the reader 
aware that such a plan does exist for providing liability 
insurance to substandard risks. Policies under the Plan are 
written for a term of one year with basic limits of $10,000/ 
$20,000 bodily injury and $5,000 property damage to conform 
with the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act. 
It should be mentioned that undesirable risks do not 
necessarily have to be first subjected to the requirements of 
the Act to be considered for assignment. A person may be 
considered under the Plan even though he has not been involved 
in an accident or been convicted of a serious traffic viola- 
tion. However, under those circumstances, it is doubtful that 
assigned risk would be needed to obtain insurance. 
Although the assigned risk plan was in effect some 
seven years prior to the enactment of the Safety Responsi- 
bility Act, the Act appears to have had some influence in 
bringing about an increase in the number of substandard risks 
who began seeking insurance coverage. For instance, during 
the period from July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1957, the number of 
policies written through the Plan was 5,915. To June 30, 
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1958, 13,509 policies were written; 18,921 were written 
during the next twelve months, and 18,297 policies were 
written from July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960.1 These figures 
are significant only to the extent that they show a very 
marked increase in the number of persons who sought automobile 
liability insurance under assigned risk after June 30, 1957. 
This period of marked increase coincides with the enactment 
of the Safety Responsibility Act during the 1957 session of 
the legislature. 
'Source: Office of the Kansas Automobile Assigned 
Risk Plan, Topeka, Kansas. 
CHAPTER V 
POLICE POWER AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Without doubt the private automobile is the primary 
mode of individual transportation in a highly mobile society 
such as ours, and it can probably be said that the automobile 
is an economic as well as social necessity. Automobiles are 
used by persons commuting to places of employment, and by 
salespeople to move from customer to customer. Planners of 
shopping centers give prime consideration to the availability 
of land for parking when choosing an appropriate location, 
while other individual businesses consider accessibility to 
adequate highway routes before making any decisions to change 
locations. In addition, individuals desire to use automobiles 
for purely social reasons; for vacation use, weekend trips, or 
visiting friends and relatives. 
While many other illustrations could be given, it is 
readily apparent that without the automobile, society's ease 
of mobility would be seriously impaired. By the same token, 
a license to operate a motor vehicle is of tremendous value to 
the individual operator, and individual mobility would be 
severely restricted if the license should be taken away. 
In many instances persons are dependent on their auto- 
mobile for their livelihood; yet in spite of this the Safety 
Responsibility Act empowers the Motor Vehicle Department to 
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suspend the license or registration certificate of any owner 
or driver who fails to post security within the specified 
time period following a reportable accident. It is the pur- 
pose of this chapter to examine the right of a state to sus- 
pend or revoke the license of a driver who faces this penalty. 
In order to gain the proper perspective to the problem, 
it should be remembered, first of all, that as the several 
states became united a portion of the power inherent in the 
state sovereignty was transferred to the federal government. 
Although state governments are subordinate in the system, 
they do retain a large portion of their former sovereign 
characteristics in what is commonly designated as the "police 
power." As long as a state's action under its police power 
is not in conflict with the federal government, the state is 
allowed to make whatever regulations it desires to govern and 
regulate its citizens. When a conflict between state and 
federal power appears to exist, the matter must be decided by 
the courts through interpretation of constitutional provi- 
sions. If the court finds that there is no conflict, it will 
uphold the state regulation as being a reasonable exercise of 
its police power. However, if the court determines that there 
is, in fact, a conflict, state authority will be forced to 
yield. 
In determining the authority of a state to regulate 
the operation of motor vehicles, or more specifically the 
right of a state to suspend or revoke an individual's driver's 
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license, the criterion used is the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' As one writer stated: 
. the function of due process is to reconcile and 
adjust interests where necessary--it does not deny a 
state's power to regulate, although it does put a 
limitation on that power. Due process simply aids in 
the judicial determination of whether particular 
state action is proper as a valid exercise of the 
police power or forbidden as an improper violation of 
constitutional rights.2 
Due process of law protects the interest of the individual by 
preventing a motor vehicle administrator or judge from acting 
in an arbitrary manner in suspending or revoking an individ- 
ual's license. 
Throughout this report the operation of a motor vehicle 
has been referred to as being a "privilege" rather than a 
"right," and the implication involved should become apparent. 
If a license denotes merely a privilege granted by a state to 
operate an automobile, then this privilege may be just as 
easily taken away, by regulation or other means. If, on the 
other hand, a license is considered to be a property right, 
then such right is protected by the federal constitution. 
One of the very earliest cases dealing with this ques- 
tion was the 1913 New York case of People v. Rosenheimer 
which created the doctrine that the operation of automobiles 
1 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 1: ". . nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, with- 
out due process of law . . . ." 
2 
John H. Reese, The Legal Nature of a Driver's License 
(Washington: Automotive Safety Foundation, 1965), p. 33. 
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on highways is a privilege granted by the state.3 A 1938 
New Hampshire Supreme Court decided that the right to drive 
an automobile was not a right guaranteed under the constitu- 
tion, but a privilege which the citizen was at liberty to 
accept by becoming a licensee, or not, as he pleased. Having 
accepted the privilege, the Court said the driver could not 
then object to any conditions attached by the grantor which, 
if it had so chosen, could have withheld the privilege 
entirely. 4 
The weight of authority, in deciding the issue of a 
state's authority to suspend a driver's license for failure to 
post security, is in agreement that such statutes represent a 
valid exercise of the police power and are not in violation 
of the due process clause.5 
3 
209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913). 
4 Rosenblum v. Griffin, 197 A. 701 (1938). 
5Arizona--State ex rel. Sullivan v. Price, 49 Ariz. 
19, 63 P. 2d 653. Arkansas--Franklin v. Scurlock, 224 Ark. 
168, 272 S.W. 2d 62 (1954). California--Sheehan v. Division 
of Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal App. 200, 35 P. 2d (1934). Iowa- - 
Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W. 2d 52 (1951). Kentucky- - 
Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W. 2d 141 (1951). Nebraska--Hadden v. 
Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W. 2d 621, 35 ALR 2d 1003 (1952). 
New York--Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 62 S.Ct. 24, 86 L.Ed. 
21 (1941).TIETO--Ragland v. Wallace, 80 Ohio App. 210, 70 
N.E. 2d 118 (1946). Pennsylvil":7Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 
78 Pa. D&C 6 (1951). Rhode Island--Berberian v. Lussier, 
139 A. 2d 869, 873 (1958). Tennessee--Sullins v. Butler 175 
Tenn. 468, 135 S.W. 2d 930 (1939). Texas-- Gillaspie v. 
Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W. 2d 177, 
347 U.S. 933, 74 S.Ct. 625, 98 L.Ed. 1084 (1953). West Vir- 
ginia--Nulter v. State Road Comm., 119 W.Va. 312, 194 S.E. 
270 (1937). Wisconsin--State v. Stehiek, 262 Wis. 652, 56 
N.W. 2d 514 (1953). 
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Although many of these earlier decisions were founded 
on the premise that the operation of a motor vehicle was a 
mere privilege, a case decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona 
on March 27, 19636 held such a statute to be constitutional 
and not in violation of the due process clause even though the 
use of an automobile was viewed as being a right rather than 
a privilege. The Court said: 
In this day, when the motor vehicle is such an impor- 
tant part of our modern day living, when the use of 
the vehicle is so essential to both a livelihood and 
the enjoyment of life, this Court recognizes that 
the use of the public highways is a right which all 
qualified citizens possess, subject, of course, to 
reasonable regulation under the police power of the 
sovereign. 
The validity of financial responsibility acts has been 
consistently upheld against constitutional objections of all 
varieties. The reasoning seems to rest on the view that the 
state, in the exercise of its police power, may make reason- 
able regulations as to the use of its highways, and that since 
financial responsibility acts aim to promote safety on the 
highways by protecting the users against financially irrespon- 
sible persons, they are reasonable regulations within such 
power. Of course, the acts must meet the basic requirements 
of any statute as to the proper manner of enactment. One 
annotator wrote: 
6 
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 
136 (1963). 
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Where a question has been raised as to the validity 
of statutes providing for the suspension or revoca- 
tion of the operator's license and registration 
certificate of any person involved in a motor vehicle 
accident which resulted in personal injury or property 
damage usually of a certain specified amount, unless 
such person deposits or posts security in an amount 
sufficient to satisfy any judgment which might be ob- 
tained against him as a result of the accident, the 
courts have uniformly held such acts valid.7 
An exception to the above came in the form of a 
Colorado Supreme Court case rendered July 3, 1961 which de- 
clared unconstitutional that section of Colorado's safety 
responsibility law pertaining to the suspension of a driver's 
license and registration certificate for failure to post 
security. 8 The Court found that this section 
has nothing whatever to do with the protection of the 
public safety, health, morals or welfare. It is a 
device designated and intended to bring about the 
posting of security for the payment of a private obli- 
gation without the slightest indication that any legal 
obligation exists on the part of any person. The 
public gets no protection whatever from the deposit of 
such security. This is not the situation we find in 
some states where the statutes require public liability 
insurance as a condition to be met before a driver's 
license will issue. Such statute protects the public. 
The statute before us is entirely different. In the 
matters to which we have particularly directed atten- 
tion, C.R.S. '53, 13-7-7 is unconstitutional. 
In finding that suspension of driving privileges and 
vehicle registration for failure to deposit security deprives 
7 
35 A.L.R. 2d p. 1021 (1954). 
8People v. Nothaus, 363 P. 2d 180 (1961). The section 
dealt with by the Court was 13-7-7, Colorado Revised Statutes 
1953, which required uninsured drivers and owners of motor 
vehicles involved in accidents to deposit security sufficient 
"to satisfy any judgment for damages resulting from such 
accident as may be recovered against such operator or owner." 
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the licensee of a property right by preventing him from using 
and enjoying his vehicle the Court said: 
The term property, within the meaning of the due 
process clause, includes the right to make full use 
of the property which one has the inalienable right 
to acquire. 
Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use of 
the public highways of the state; every citizen has 
full freedom to travel from place to place in the 
enjoyment of life and liberty . . . . Any unreason- 
able restraint upon the freedom of the individual to 
make use of the public highways cannot be sustained. 
Regulations imposed upon the right of the citizen to 
make use of the public highways must have a fair 
relationship to the protection of the public safety 
in order to be valid. 
The majority opinion cited no authority whatever for 
its decision, and at the same time implied that all previous 
authority had overlooked basic constitutional guarantees. 
It concluded: 
On a matter so basic and fundamental no additional 
citation of authority is required. We reach this 
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that other juris- 
dictions have seemingly overlooked basic constitution- 
al guarantees which must be ignored in reaching the 
opposite conclusion. 
Much has been written about this particular decision,9 
and there was consternation at the outset that all so-called 
9 
48 Iowa Law Review, pp. 140-47, 21 Maryland Law 
Review, pp. 361-627 34 Rocky Mountain Law Review, pp. 252-55, 
16 Southwestern Law Journal, pp. 685-89, 7 Utah Law Review, 
pp. 546-51, 47 VirTiinia Law Review, pp. 1247-52, 13 Western 
Reserve Law Review, pp. 408-10. 
For an interesting analysis of the Colorado case, see also an 
article by Robert L. Donigan, General Counsel, and Edward C. 
Fisher, Associate Counsel, The Traffic Institute, Northwestern 
University in October, 1961 "Traffic Digest and Review," 
pp. 32-40. 
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financial responsibility laws would be placed in jeopardy by 
the decision. However, there are apparently no subsequent 
cases which have followed the same line of reasoning as the 
Colorado Supreme Court, and the case seems to stand alone 
without establishing any precedent whatever.10 
The right-privilege dichotomy has not been completely 
settled by the courts at this time, but regardless of what 
term is given the driver's license, the weight of authority 
upholds a state's right to suspend or revoke an individual's 
license in the interest of public welfare by removing irre- 
sponsible and reckless drivers from the highways. In explain- 
ing the legal nature of a driver's license, John H. Reese, 
Assistant Dean, School of Business Administration, and Asso- 
ciate Professor of Finance at Texas Technological College, 
wrote: 
In finality, it is suggested that the time-worn right- 
privilege approach to driver licensing be abandoned as 
essentially meaningless for adequate analysis of legal 
problems involving motor vehicle operation. Future 
research efforts should be based on a realistic legal 
theory which openly recognizes the importance of motor 
vehicle operation to the individual. In order to 
implement such a philosophy, let our research emphasize 
the development of appropriate due process of law 
criteria which will serve adequately to protet the 
interests of both the individual and society. 
10 
The 1965 Session Laws of Colorado indicate that 
sections 13-7-4 through 13-7-7 of the Colorado Motor Vehicle 
Responsibility Act "are presently being expanded." 
11 Reece, 22. cit., p. 52. In this Master of Laws 
thesis, Professor Reece examined in great detail the histor- 
ical evolution of the right-privilege dichotomy, and says 
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Generally speaking, the question of due process arises 
in the area of discretionary suspensions, and the requirements 
of due process are usually met if provisions are made for an 
administrative hearing with the right to a judicial appeal. 
The Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides 
the opportunity for an administrative hearing as well as the 
right of appeal to the district court of the county in which 
the aggrieved party resides. Therefore, it is concluded, at 
least arguendo, that the state does have ample authority, 
under its police powers, to prohibit operation of a motor 
vehicle through mandatory revocation or suspension of any 
person who has demonstrated his financial irresponsibility. 
basically that the approach has shown itself to be an inade- 
quate tool for proper legal analysis. His work does not 
stand for the proposition that a license to drive cannot be 
suspended, revoked, or cancelled, but that a person cannot 
be deprived of his license except in procedures consistent 
with due process of law, regardless of whether the indi- 
vidual's interest in driving is a right or a privilege. 
CHAPTER VI 
ADMINISTRATION 
In General 
The provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act are 
administered and enforced by the Safety Responsibility Divi- 
sion of the Motor Vehicle Department which is granted 
authority to make reasonable rules and regulations necessary 
for the administration of the Act. Among other things, the 
department receives and processes all accident reports of 
persons affected by the Act, issues security notices, receives 
and distributes all security that is deposited, handles com- 
plaints and conducts hearings, issues suspension notices and 
pick-up orders, and handles requests for reinstatement of 
owners and drivers. 
The processing of any accident case begins with receipt 
of accident reports from the owner or drivers involved. These 
reports are coded and matched with any other reports from 
drivers involved in the same accident. From that point on 
the individual reports are put together in one file and become 
a "case." The case then is processed through procedures 
already discussed, such as insurance certification, evaluation, 
security requirements, security deposits, suspension notices, 
pick-ups, and so forth. 
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The number of accident reports received by the depart- 
ment increased from 63,136 in 1960 to 76,878 in 1965. This 
was an increase of 13,742 or 21.8 per cent. This illustrates, 
of course, that the division is administrating a "growing" 
business. In 1962 there were 10,006 security requests and 
3,124 pick-ups issued as compared to 10,971 security requests 
and 2,562 pick-ups issued in 1965. 
Security 
The Safety Responsibility Division is responsible for 
receipt and disposition of all security deposited by persons 
who come under the requirements of the Act. This security, as 
we have seen, applies only to the payment of a judgment or 
judgments rendered against the person or persons on whose 
behalf the deposit is made, for damages arising out of the 
accident, or to the settlement of a claim or claims arising 
out of the accident upon proper assignment by the person 
making the deposit. 
If security has already been posted with the department 
and the person depositing the security later is released from 
liability, obtains a judgment of non-liability, or enters into 
an agreement with the claimant or claimants to pay an agreed 
amount, the security on deposit is returned to him. Security 
is also returned to the depositor after one year has elapsed 
since the security was posted, provided no suit for damages 
is pending against him. 
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Table I has been prepared to emphasize the magnitude 
of the security function of the Motor Vehicle Department, 
Safety Responsibility Division. It is a summary of cash bonds 
and real estate and corporate surety bonds deposited with the 
department as security from 1961 through 1965. It is neces- 
sary to keep in mind that while the department presently 
accepts only cash, in one form or another, as security, real 
estate and surety bonds also were a satisfactory method of 
meeting the security requirements prior to September 8, 1965. 
This summary also shows the amount of security returned to 
the depositor during the five-year period. 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF SECURITY RECEIVED AND RETURNED 
1961-1965 
Year 
Cash bonds 
(In thousands) 
Received Returned 
Real Estate and 
Surety Bonds 
(In thousands) 
Received Returned 
Total bonds 
(In thousands) 
Received Returned 
1961 $102.3 $ 97.8 $124.0 $ 53.4 $226.2 $151.3 
1962 121.6 108.5 134.8 163.3 230.1 271.9 
1963 130.3 125.1 184.4 120.0 314.8 245.1 
1964 133.7 130.6 221.6 138.4 355.2 269.0 
1965 188.3 129.6 179.6 190.7 367.8 320.2 
Source: Motor Vehicle Department, Safety Responsi- 
bility Division. 
The amount of cash deposited in a trust fund with the 
State Treasurer representing cash security posted as of 
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December 31, 1965 was $181,316.24. The department also had 
on hand as of December 31, 1965, corporate surety and real 
estate bonds posted as security amounting to $330,051.75. 
The total amount of security not returned or otherwise dis- 
posed of as of December 31, 1965 was $511,367.99. 
Cost 
The cost of administration and enforcement of the 
Safety Responsibility Act by the Motor Vehicle Department is 
not borne directly by those persons involved in reportable 
accidents, and the expense of processing the reports to 
finality is no small amount. The Safety Responsibility 
Division estimated in 1962 that the total cost of processing 
the report of an insured driver involved in an accident was 
$2.39 contrasted with a cost of $10.02 for processing an 
accident report involving an uninsured driver who complied 
with the requirements by depositing security, releases, agree- 
ments to pay, etc., or by voluntarily surrendering his 
driver's license. On the other hand, the cost to process an 
accident report of an uninsured driver who failed to comply 
with the security requirements and refused to voluntarily 
surrender his license was estimated to be $18.68. 1 Remember- 
ing that in 1965 the department received 76,878 accident 
1 
Motor Vehicle Department, Safety Responsibility 
Division, Cost to the De?artment for Processing Accidents 
Under Safety Responsibility Act, 1962. 
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reports, involving uninsured as well as insured drivers, it 
should be readily apparent that the price of ensuring finan- 
cial responsibility on the part of the state's drivers is 
not cheap. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT--HOW EFFECTIVE? 
The purpose of the Act, as stated in it's title, is to 
promote highway safety by eliminating the reckless and irre- 
sponsible driver, provide for the giving of security by 
persons owning or driving vehicles which are subject to regis- 
tration who have been involved in an accident, and provide for 
the furnishing of proof of future financial responsibility by 
those convicted of certain traffic offenses. These individ- 
uals have presumably indicated that their presence as drivers 
on the highways is inimical to public safety unless they are 
able to show evidence of their financial responsibility in 
case of an accident or traffic violation. Attainment of the 
safety objective of the Act, therefore, must be predicated 
upon the theory that safety on the highways may be largely 
achieved through the process of removal of the uninsured or 
otherwise financially irresponsible driver. The Act seems to 
presume that the uninsured and financially irresponsible 
drivers are more dangerous to highway safety than those who 
are insured or are otherwise able to pay cash for their negli- 
gence. The point is, can the highways be made safer simply 
by removing those drivers who are not able to show evidence 
of financial responsibility? It would appear not, for the 
number of reported automobile accidents increased from 24,084 
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in 1955 to 38,555 in 1965, an increase of 60.1 per cent. 
During the same period, automobile registrations increased 
from 1,078,107 to 1,386,427, a total of 28.6 per cent. This 
means that the number of reported accidents increased at a 
faster rate than the number of cars. 
There does not appear to be any evidence of direct 
correlation between insured or otherwise financially respon- 
sible drivers and the number of accidents that occur each 
year. Furthermore, there is no evidence which might suggest 
that the Act prevents accidents or in any other manner makes 
the highways safer. The continually rising accident rate 
indicates that the reckless and negligent motorist is still 
operating his vehicle on state highways, even though he may 
now be insured. 
Although the Safety Responsibility Act has apparently 
met with little or no success in reducing the number of motor 
vehicle accidents, there is no doubt but that it has effec- 
tively reduced the percentage of uninsured motorists who use 
the highways, or at least the percentage of those involved in 
reportable accidents. Robert Burtis, Financial Responsibility 
Division Attorney in 1941 wrote in May of that year, almost 
two years after the 1939 law had been enacted: "To date, 
1,841 persons have become subject to the Financial Responsi- 
bility law. Two hundred and fifty-three (13 per cent) have 
filed certificates of insurance which are in good order at 
present time. Four hundred and thirty have surrendered their 
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license tags and registration receipts . . . ."1 
While 13 per cent of the drivers were insured in 1941, 
the complete reversal was true for 1965 (see Table II) when 
87 per cent of the motorists were insured. But, one might 
ask, just what is meant by the fact that 87 per cent of the 
drivers were insured in 1965? Does it mean that 87 per cent 
of all persons licensed to drive are insured? And, if so, how 
was this determined? 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF DRIVERS INSURED AND UNINSURED 
1961-1965 
Accident Drivers Per cent 
reports Per cent Drivers Per cent un- un- 
Year received increase insured insured insured insured 
1961 63,549 0.6 52,428 82.5 11,121 17.5 
1962 69,447 7.7 59,030 85.0 10,417 15.0 
1963 72,124 3.8 61,305 85.0 10,819 15.0 
1964 74,017 2.6 65,135 88.0 8,882 12.0 
1965 76,878 3.8 68,421 87.0 8,457 13.0 
Source: Motor Vehicle Department, Safety Responsi- 
bility Division. 
Admittedly, it is not possible to determine accurately 
the number of uninsured drivers or the extent to which the 
1 
Robert H. Burtis, "The Operation of the Kansas Finan- 
cial Responsibility Law," 9 Kansas Bar Journal (May, 1941), 
p. 368. 
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Safety Responsibility Act has encouraged motorists to become 
insured since the figures on licensed drivers, motor vehicles, 
and insured motorists are all in continuous fluctuation. 
Licensed drivers die, stop operating vehicles, or move from 
the state. Automobiles are sold, destroyed, or registered in 
another state when the owners move. Insured motorists die, 
dispose of, wreck or lose their cars, move out of the state, 
or lose their insurance. And new ones take their place. 
For these reasons, records are kept to determine the 
number of uninsured motorists, not as a numerical entity at 
an instant of time, but rather over a period of time, using 
the means available to arrive at a specific percentile of a 
sampling of the total number of vehicles involved in report- 
able motor vehicle accidents. This is done by examining the 
accident reports processed by the department, determining the 
total number of drivers involved in accidents, and the number 
of uninsured drivers of that total. 
There are, of course, weaknesses of such sampling, the 
more apparent being: (1) reports are probably not always 
filed when all drivers involved in an accident are insured 
because they then serve no practical purpose, (2) reports are 
probably not always filed when all drivers in an accident are 
uninsured because it would require that security be deposited 
by all, and (3) the sample constitutes only about 5 per cent 
of the total number of vehicles registered. 
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In spite of these limitations, it may be said in 
defense that 76,000 reports constitute a fair representation 
on which to base statistical data, and furthermore, even 
though the percentage of insured drivers is not completely 
accurate, the Act will still affect those persons who are 
financially irresponsible, and as long as it does that, then 
statistics are actually needed only for evaluation, and serve 
no particular purpose in administration or enforcement. 
Enforcement 
In order to make the Act really effective, there must 
exist some means of promptly retrieving the licenses of 
drivers, and the license plates and registrations of owners 
who do not comply with the security requirements for a strong 
law weakly enforced, becomes merely another weak law. To 
enforce the Act against those drivers and owners who do not 
voluntarily surrender their licenses and registration certifi- 
cates, the department has ten investigators assigned to 
specific territories throughout the state. One of the func- 
tions of an investigator is to locate suspended persons who 
have not surrendered the items requested by the department 
and make the necessary pick-up. The investigators are quite 
successful in making these pick-ups, having completed 1,819 
of 2,562 pick-ups issued in 1965, or 71 per cent. They are 
hampered in their efforts, of course, by persons who purposely 
evade the penalty by moving without leaving any forwarding 
address. 
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In addition to this method, the department publishes a 
weekly list of all suspended persons, and this list is sent 
to law enforcement officers and courts throughout the state. 
The law enforcement agencies also assist the department in 
making pick-ups by being alerted to the license tag numbers 
of all suspended owners or drivers. 
There is one weakness, however, which seems worthy of 
mention. The problem develops partly because of the fact that 
individual county treasurers are not given any information 
regarding owners of vehicles whose license tags have been 
lifted, and partly because applications for registration re- 
newals are sent from the Motor Vehicle Department about 
October of each year in order for every owner of a vehicle to 
be able to purchase new tags when they become available the 
first of January. The problem which results from this combi- 
nation is simply this: (1) If an individual owner is not on 
the suspended list at the Motor Vehicle Department when the 
registration applications are mailed, even though he may 
become suspended later, he will receive an application form. 
(2) All that is needed to purchase a new license tag, in 
addition to the required sum of money, is the application 
form. (3) A new tag may be purchased and installed on the 
vehicle even though the owner has been suspended. 
The victory gained by the owner in the above circum- 
stance is short-lived, however. One part of the three-part 
registration application is returned to the Motor Vehicle 
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Department by the county treasurer after the tag is sold. 
The department checks all returned applications against the 
list of suspensions to determine the identity of any suspended 
persons who have purchased new license tags to replace those 
lifted by the department. A pick-up order is then issued for 
the new tag and it, too, soon comes into the possession of 
the department. 
Although the department is aware of this gap, it 
believes that the additional time and expense connected with 
catching these violators on the rebound is less than that 
which would be involved in sending suspension and withdrawal 
of suspension notices to all of the county treasurers' 
offices. 
CHAPTER VIII 
COMPULSORY INSURANCE v. SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
In 1965 only three of the fifty states--Massachusetts, 
New York, and North Carolina--had compulsory automobile 
liability insurance laws. Massachusetts has had such a law 
since January 1, 1927. New York's law went into effect 
February 1, 1957, and North Carolina has had its law on the 
books since January 1, 1958. In these states, every owner of 
a motor vehicle is required to purchase automobile liability 
insurance as a condition to registration. The law is con- 
cerned only with the motor vehicle and its registration, the 
object being to have insurance placed in force on all auto- 
mobiles registered in the state. 
Compulsory insurance has, for many years, been argued 
as an alternative for safety responsibility laws. The pros 
and cons of compulsory insurance have been discussed since 
Massachusetts enacted such legislation in 1927, and the sub- 
ject still remains highly controversial. Since it is outside 
the scope of this study, an exhaustive analysis of the com- 
pulsory insurance laws will not be made. Proponents and 
critics of such laws are not able to agree on the merits of 
this type legislation, and all that will be offered here is a 
short summary of some of the principal arguments for and 
against compulsory insurance. 
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It is argued primarily that if all registered motor 
vehicles had to be insured, the weaknesses inherent in safety 
responsibility laws would be overcome. These weaknesses, 
according to one author, are: (1) a significant number of 
recalcitrant irresponsible owners still do not insure their 
automobiles, (2) the victims of the first accident involving 
an uninsured and financially irresponsible motorist are left 
without compensation regardless of the corrective measures 
taken against him after the first accident, and (3) because 
the financially irresponsible are seldom worth suing for 
damages, they are allowed under most laws to resume driving 
without insurance after one year from the date of accident.' 
Opponents of compulsory insurance have argued, and 
just as strenuously as the proponents, that such a law is 
weak and deficient in the following ways: (1) it cannot 
compel and is impossible to enforce, (2) it costs millions of 
dollars to administer, (3) it creates an unneeded government 
bureaucracy, (4) it does not protect the responsible citizen, 
(5) it increases the cost of automobile insurance, and (6) it 
causes the frequency of claims to increase.2 
1 
Calvin H. Brainard, Automobile Insurance (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961), p. 429. 
2 
National Association of Independent Insurers, A Fact 
Sheet for Newspaper Editors (The Case Against Compulsory 
Automoiie Liability Insurance. Chicago: National Associ- 
ation of Independent Insurers), pp. 1-10. 
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Safety responsibility laws, on the other hand, are as 
much concerned with the driver and his operator's license as 
with the motor vehicle and its registration. These laws are 
not compulsory legislation to the extent that automobile 
liability insurance is a prerequisite to registration. How- 
ever, it might be said that such laws are compulsory on a 
selective individual motorist basis. The acts do not apply 
to motorists who discharge their duties under the law, but if 
there is a breach of that duty, such as an accident, the 
guilty party will be visited by penalty and compulsion; i.e., 
security will be required or the privilege to drive will be 
suspended. In case of certain traffic violations or failure 
to satisfy a judgment, the offender becomes required to show 
proof of future financial responsibility before his license 
can be reinstated. In this respect the acts are compulsory. 
Safety Responsibility laws do not change the methods 
by which rates are fixed, nor do they interfere with the 
ability of insurance companies to compete in a free market or 
devise improved forms of coverage. They do not curtail pro- 
tection afforded by existing policies nor interfere with or 
attempt to control in any way the remuneration paid to agents 
and brokers. They in no way place the state in the insurance 
business. All that they do is require motorists to maintain 
insurance or other evidence of financial responsibility. 
The real point at issue in the controversy of compul- 
sory insurance versus safety responsibility laws seems merely 
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to be whether a compulsory act would produce a higher 
percentage of insured motorists in a given state than could 
be obtained under a security-type safety responsibility law. 
Since it is equally difficult to measure objectively the 
percentage of uninsured motorists under either type law, this 
issue would be extremely difficult to prove. 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Kansas Safety Responsibility Act is directed 
specifically toward two classes of motorists; those who are 
involved in accidents, and those who flagrantly and habit- 
ually disregard traffic laws. The implied objective of the 
Act is to have every driver and owner of a motor vehicle show 
evidence of financial responsibility, both present and future, 
hopefully through automobile liability insurance coverage. 
The stated objective, mentioned previously, is to "eliminate 
the reckless and irresponsible driver from the highway. . . ." 
Although the Act is meant to provide accident victims 
with the compensation to which they are entitled under common- 
law negligence, up to a limit specified by the department, 
this does not mean that a victim is assured of automatic pay- 
ment, nor does it mean that he has in every instance to bring 
a civil action against the wrongdoer. It simply provides for 
a specified sum of money to be collected by the department 
and set aside for use as payment of judgments or in settlement 
of claims against the wrongdoer, provided he is legally 
liable for damages arising out of the accident. 
Since evidence of an automobile liability insurance 
policy in force at the time of an accident exempts a driver 
or owner from the security provisions of the Act, this method 
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has become the most popular one of providing evidence of 
financial responsibility. It must be kept in mind, however, 
that the mere fact that an insurance policy was in force does 
not guarantee payment of damages to any party. First, a 
driver must have been guilty of negligence and therefore have 
become legally obligated to pay, and second, the driver must 
not have been guilty of any acts which would violate the 
conditions of the insurance policy and render it void. 
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove that the Act has in any way increased highway safety by 
implanting safety consciousness in the minds of all motor 
vehicle operators. The thought seems to be that, in order to 
avoid the penalties inherent in the Act, most drivers will 
either insure their automobiles, or they will drive with an 
increased sense of care and responsibility toward others. 
The minority, then, who neither insure nor drive more care- 
fully will sooner or later have an accident, the result being 
the suspension or revocation of their driving privileges. 
Therefore, as time passes, negligent and financially irrespon- 
sible persons will gradually be immobilized and the highways 
thereby made increasingly safer. 
The Safety Responsibility Division of the Motor Vehicle 
Department has no authority to remove the "reckless and irre- 
sponsible driver" from the highway except in cases where such 
driver (1) has an accident and (2) is uninsured and can offer 
no other proof of his financial responsibility. If such a 
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driver has had his license suspended or revoked for conviction 
of specified traffic violations, then the division can require 
proof of future financial responsibility. But the Act makes 
no provision for removing negligent drivers per se, and to 
this extent highway safety is outside the scope of the Safety 
Responsibility Act. A good traffic safety program, strict 
enforcement of the motor vehicle laws, competent traffic 
courts, and rigid driver examinations and licensing will offer 
a sound highway program in which the rights and safety of the 
individual will be adequately protected. Inasmuch as highway 
safety cannot be objectively equated to financial responsi- 
bility of motorists, and because there is no evidence to 
indicate that the number of traffic accidents has diminished 
as a result of its enactment, the Act cannot properly or 
accurately be termed a safety measure. 
The Act has successfully increased the percentage of 
insured drivers from about 35 per cent at its inception to 87 
per cent in 1965. Because being insured is practically synon- 
ymous with being financially responsible, for purposes of the 
Act at least, the Kansas Legislature has gone a long way in 
relieving the distress of uncompensated victims of automobile 
accidents in cases where the negligent operator would other- 
wise be unable to pay for damages assessed against him. 
Despite the overall success which the Act in its pres- 
ent form has had in reducing the percentage of uninsured 
drivers, the three glaring weaknesses referred to previously 
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in this report seem important enough to be worthy of mention 
again. The weaknesses refer generally to (1) proof of future 
financial responsibility following accidents, (2) release of 
security after one year from date of accident, and (3) the 
inconsistency of the maximum amount required for security and 
for proof. 
As the Act is presently written, any uninsured driver 
involved in an accident will have the security which he 
deposited returned to him after one year has elapsed, provided 
no suit for damages has been instituted against him. Since 
in many instances it is economically impractical to sue a 
person who has no money, the Act falsely assumes that such 
driver must not have been guilty of improper driving, and his 
license is returned after one year, allowing him to resume 
driving, still no more financially responsible than before. 
It is recommended, therefore, that the Act be amended to 
require that whenever an operator or owner must post security 
for a past accident, he shall give and maintain proof of 
financial responsibility for future accidents for a period of 
two years from the date such proof is required. 
As was just noted, the Act provides that if no suit or 
judgment is pending, the wrongdoer shall have the security he 
deposited returned to him after the lapse of one year. It is 
recommended that security be required to be held for a period 
of two years in the absence of one of the specified causes 
for earlier release such as settlement of pending claims or 
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satisfaction of a judgment. This proposal would bring the 
deposit period into closer alignment with the statute of 
limitations generally governing the bringing of an action for 
for damages, thereby being of significant benefit to those 
persons having a claim for injury or damage which is still 
valid under the statue of limitations. 
The Act presently states that proof, when required to 
be furnished, may be in a specified manner with a maximum 
total of $11,000. Security, on the other hand, may be required 
in case of a serious accident for as much as $25,000. It is 
proposed that the proof requirement be amended to conform with 
the higher security requirement. 
Although it is inaccurate to term the Act a safety 
measure in the sense of diminishing the number of accidents 
or eliminating the reckless and irresponsible driver from the 
highways, it has resulted in a substantial improvement in the 
percentage of insured drivers (thereby reducing the percentage 
of financially irresponsible drivers), and by modifying its 
stated objective to this extent, the Act has accomplished the 
major purpose for which it was, in fact, intended. 
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APPENDIXES 
KANSAS MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPORT 
Mail Within 24 Hours To: Motor Vehicle Department 
State Office Building, Topeka, Kansas 
A 
ACCIDENT CASE NO. 
71 
DAY OF A. M. 
DATE OF ACCIDENT WEEK HOUR P M 
Month Day Year 
LOCATION OF ACCIDENT 
Town 
V TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES INVOLVED 
County 
OCCUPATION 
State 
E 
DRIVER'S NAME 
H 
i DRIVER'S ADDRESS 
Street or R. F. D. Town 
C DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER DATE OF BIRTH 
State 
State 
OWNER'S NAME 
OWNER'S ADDRESS 
1 
Street or R. F. D. Town State 
MAKE OF VEHICLE VEHICLE TAG 
Type Year Year State Number 
PARTS OF VEHICLE DAMAGED $ 
MOTOR, SERIAL or I. D. NUMBER 
Approximate Cost 
INJURY REPORT FOR OCCUPANTS IN YOUR VEHICLE 
CODE FOR INJURY NOTE: USE MOST SERIOUS INJURY TO OCCUPANT 
K-Dead before report made. B-Other visible injury, as bruises, abrasions, swelling, limping, etc. 
A-Visible signs of injury, as bleeding wound or distorted member; C-No visible injury but complaint of pain or momentary unconsciousness. 
or had to be carried from scene. 0-No indication of injury. 
OCCUPANTS -(Include driver injury) If more than three injuries use additional report form. 
AGE SEX INJURY 
.4.4 
a 
-< 
.E-i 1
ra . 
6 
* 
YES NO 
Name Street or R. F. D. City and State 
YES NO El 
Name Street or R. F. D. City and State 
YES NO 
Name Street or R. F. D. City and State 
YOUR INSURANCE CO. (Liability) 
AGENT ADDRESS PHONE NO 
POLICY NO POLICY PERIOD FROM TO 
SIGNATURE OF POLICY HOLDER 
K. C. C. NO SR-23 LI FLEET INSURANCE ON FILE? LI 
FOR INSURANCE COMPANY USE ONLY 
IF POLICY (10-20-5) NOT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT RETURN THIS ENTIRE FORM WITHIN 30 DAYS 
REASON FOR REFUSAL 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE DATE 
SR-21 PERSON REPORTING MUST COMPLETE OTHER SIDE 
V DRIVER'S NAME AGE 
E DRIVER'S ADDRESS 
H 
DRIVER'S LICENSE NO. 
Street or 11. F. D. Town 
STATE 
State 
I 
C OWNER'S NAME 
L OWNER'S ADDRESS 
Street 
MAKE OF 
VEHICLE 
or R. F. D. Town 
VEHICLE 
TAG 
State 
2 
Type Year Year State Number 
V DRIVER'S NAME AGE 
E DRIVER'S ADDRESS 
H 
DRIVER'S LICENSE NO. 
Street or R. F. D. Town 
STATE 
State 
I 
C OWNER'S NAME 
L OWNER'S ADDRESS 
Street 
3 
MAKE OE j VEHICLE 
or R. F. D. Town 
VEHICLE 
TAG 
State 
Type Year Year State Number 
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 
OTHER THAN VEHICLES 
NAME OF OWNER 
OF OBJECT DAMAGED 
Object Damaged 
ADDRESS OF OWNER 
DESCRIBE THE ACCIDENT 
Street or R. F. D. Town State 
GIVE EXACT 
LOCATION OF ACCIDENT 
DATE OF THIS ACCIDENT 
DATE OF THIS REPORT DRIVER SIGN HERE 
31 -31/34-246-T 3-66-100M 
NVNL II. ANTHY. 
Governor 
DRIVER: 
OWNER: 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT 
State Office Building 
Topeka 66612 
Please refer to our file S.R.D. 
ACCIDENT CASE # 
ACCIDENT DATE : 
72 
L. A. BILLINGS, 
Superintendent 
Evidence indicates you, and/or a motor vehicle owned by you, were involved in an accident. 
This accident caused one or more of the following: 
1. Property damage in excess of $100.00 for any one person. 
2. Injury to, or death of a person. 
You must furnish this office with proof that you are financially able to comply with the 
security requirements in the sum of $ for this accident. 
(See the reverse side of this notice for ways to comply). 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, that unless you comply with this Act, the 
( ) DRIVER'S LICENSE of the DRIVER 
( ) ALL VEHICLE TAGS and REGISTRATION RECEIPTS of the OWNER 
WILL BE SUSPENDED AS OF 
AND SHALL REMAIN SUSPENDED ` AND SHALL NOT BE RENEWED, until you have complied with ALL of 
the requirements of the Kansas Motor Vehicle SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT (8-722-8-769 G.S. 
1961 Supp., As Amended By L. 1963, Ch. 59, Sec. 1-4). 
ALL suspended Kansas driver's licenses, registration receipts, and tags must be surrendered 
to this office ON OR BEFORE SUSPENSION DATE. 
Failure to return suspended items on or before suspension date will result in an order to a 
Kansas Investigator to pick up ALL suspended items. ONCE SUSPENDED, the DRIVER must sur- 
render the requested items, pass a driver's examination (if he has not done so within the 
past two years), comply with the requirements for this accident and pay a $25.00 reinstate- 
ment fee before he can be reinstated. 
SR 61 (SEE REVERSE SIDE) 
L. A. BILLINGS, SUPERINTENDENT 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT 
By: (7-4.-e--,--q-/ 
Louis J. Case er, Assistant Director 
Safety Responsibility Division 
THE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT REQUIRES YOU TO FILE PROOF THAT YOU ARE FINANCIALLY 
ABLE TO RESPOND TO ANY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES THAT MAY ARISE FROM THIS ACCIDENT EVEN 
THOUGH IT MAY APPEAR THAT YOU WERE NOT AT FAULT. (THIS DEPARTMENT DOES NOT 
DETERMINE LIABILITY.) 
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLYING WITH THIS ACT RESTS WITH YOU 
Comply with any ONE of the requirements listed below, (before your suspension date), 
and you may retain your driving and/or registration privileges. 
1. MAIL a completed accident form showing motor vehicle LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN EFFECT at the time of the accident. 
2. POST SECURITY as requested on the face of this notice. This may be by 
certified check, money order, bank draft . 
(IF, AFTER ONE YEAR, FROM THE DATE OF THE DEPOSIT, there is no judgment 
or court action pending against you, you may make application for the 
return of the deposit.) 
3. MAIL A NOTARIZED RELEASE from EACH adverse party involved, for all claims, 
regarding injuries and/or damages suffered in this accident. 
4. MAIL A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT signed by each adverse party involved, 
providing for installment payments of an agreed amount, with respect 
to all claims, for injuries and/or damages suffered in this accident. 
If at any time you default on the payments of this agreement you will 
become subject to the provisions of this act. 
5. MAIL A COURT JUDGMENT allowing for installment payments with respect to 
all claims sor injuries and/or damages suffered in this accident. 
6. Mail a certified copy of FINAL JUDGMENT OF NON-LIABILITY by a court in 
an action to collect damages. 
THERE IS ONE OTHER WAY IN WHICH YOU MAY COMPLY 
1. (a) MAIL satisfactory evidence, ONE YEAR FROM THE SUSPENSION DATE, 
THAT NO COURT ACTION has been filed against you to collect damages 
for injuries and/or damages suffered in this accident. 
* NOTE: If, and when, posting security, under Number 2, above; Sec. 8-726,G.S. 
of Kansas Requires that you specify in writing the person or persons 
on whose behalf the deposit is made. In any case, where the driver is 
not the owner of the vehicle involved, either may post security and 
include the other, if so specified in writing; otherwise each shall be 
required to post security separately. 
MAIL ALL DOCUMENTS AND SUSPENDED ITEMS TO: 
SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OFFICE BUILDING 
TOPEKA, KANSAS 
SR-61 b (Rev. 7/8/65) 
Wm, H; AVERY, 
Governor 
TO: 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT 
State Office Building 
Topeka 66612 
Please refer to: Accident Case # 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
73 
L. A. BILLINGS, 
Superintendent 
Ph. CE-5-0011 
Ext. 581 
BY AUTHORITY OF THE GENERAL STATUTES OF KANSAS, it has been determined from the records 
of this department that your privilege to operate and/or register a motor vehicle in the 
State of Kansas, should be and is hereby suspended as hereinafter set forth, for the 
following reasons: 
You failed to comply with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. 
ACTION: Suspension STATUTORY AUTHORITY: 8-727 
CAUSE: Failure to Deposit security in the amount of $ 
LENGTH OF SUSPENSION: Indefinite Period 
To avoid further or additional penalties it is important that you surrender to this 
department, immediately: 
0 DRIVER Your driverWs license 
DRIVER & OWNER Your driverls license and all registration receipts and tags 
on all vehicles registered solely or jointly in your name. 
0 OWNER ALL registration receipts and tags on all vehicles registered 
solely or jointly in your name. 
THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THIS DAY OF , 19 
LAB/PJJ/ 
L. A. BILLINGS, SUPERINTENDENT 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT 
By: 
'Paul J. John:. 0 rector 
SAFETY RES ITY DIVISION 
Mail all of the requested items to the Safety Responsibility Division, Motor Vehicle Dept., 
State Office Building, Topeka, Kansas. 
SR-61 A (Rev. 6/1/66) 
D 
AFFIDAVIT FOR RETURN OF LICENSES, SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT, TOPEKA, KANSAS 
STATE OF KANSAS 
COUNTY OF 
) SS. 
) 
74 
of lawful age being first duly sworn on his oath 
deposes and says: 
That his vehicle was involved in an automobile accident on date in 
County, Kansas, at or near a location about 
with an automobile driven by one In 
Accident Case # 
. Pursuant to an order of the Safety Responsibility Division, this 
affiant was required to post security in the amount of $ and was suspended for failure to 
post the security. 
That one year has elapsed since the time said suspension became effective, and that no 
action for damages areising out of said accident has been filed against this affiant in any Court. 
Further affiant saith not. 
Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me this 
Affiant 
day of , 19 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: SR-117 
A STUDY OF THE KANSAS MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY 
RESPONSIBILITY ACT 
by 
CHARLES ROBERT SMITH 
B. S., Kansas State University, 1956 
AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
College of Commerce 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
1966 
Americans have been "on the move" at an ever-increasing 
rate since Henry Ford first made such mass migration possible. 
The automobile has become not only an instrument for pleasure 
but, for most, a matter of economic necessity. However, the 
rise in popularity of the automobile has been accompanied by 
many problems, not the least of which is that of compensating 
victims of automobile accidents where the wrongdoer is finan- 
cially irresponsible. 
The alleviation of the economic distress of uncompen- 
sated accident victims has been accomplished, in part, through 
legislation in the form of safety responsibility laws. These 
laws are intended to encourage motorists to become insured by 
imposing financial requirements on them if they are involved 
in accidents and cannot show other evidence of financial 
responsibility. 
The Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was 
enacted by the 1957 session of the legislature, and became 
law on January 1, 1958. The stated purpose of the legislation 
is to promote safety on the highways by eliminating the reck- 
less and irresponsible driver, and to provide for the giving 
of security as evidence of financial responsibility for a 
past accident and proof of financial ability to pay a claim 
or judgment for damage arising out of a future accident. 
The provisions of the Act apply to both drivers and 
owners of motor vehicles, and a motorist may become affected 
by the Act by being involved in a motor vehicle accident, or 
2 
by being convicted for certain specified traffic violations. 
In case of an accident, the owner or driver is required to 
deposit security with the Motor Vehicle Department, Safety 
Responsibility Division, as evidence of his financial respon- 
sibility, and failure to do so within a specified time limit 
will result in a suspension or revocation of the driver's 
license and/or vehicle registration. Before reinstatement 
can be made in cases of traffic law violations, the offender 
must show proof of his financial responsibility for future 
accidents. 
Although the Act does not require automobile liability 
insurance as a prerequisite to registration, thereby making 
it a "compulsory insurance" law, it does presume that any 
owner or driver who is not protected by liability insurance 
at the time of an accident is financially irresponsible 
unless evidence to the contrary is furnished. Since insured 
drivers and owners are, in effect, exempt from the Act, motor- 
ists are induced to provide liability insurance protection 
before an accident occurs. It might be said, then, that an 
implied purpose of the Act is to eliminate the uninsured 
driver from the highways. 
The thought seems to be that, in order to avoid the 
penalties embodied in the Act, most drivers will either insure 
their automobiles or they will drive with an increased sense 
of care and responsibility toward others. The recalcitrant 
minority who neither insure nor drive more carefully will 
3 
sooner or later have an accident, the result being the 
suspension or revocation of their driving privileges. There- 
fore, as time passes, financially irresponsible persons will 
gradually be immobilized and, hopefully, the highways made 
increasingly safer. 
There is no evidence to indicate that the number of 
accidents has diminished subsequent to the enactment of the 
Act, but the number of insured drivers has increased from 13 
per cent in 1941 to 87 per cent in 1965. Since this indicates 
a very drastic reduction in the number of uninsured drivers, 
the Act seems to have accomplished its purpose in this respect. 
The object of the study was threefold: (1) to examine 
the major provisions of the Act, (2) to summarize the activ- 
ities of the Motor Vehicle Department, Safety Responsibility 
Division, in the administration and enforcement of the Act 
during its first eight years of existence, and (3) to show 
that the Act has served the purpose for which it was, in fact, 
intended. 
